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SESSION 4: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
MODERATOR: Desmond Fernando*
QUESTION: I am Chairman of a Subcommittee of the IBA
on Satellite Communications. This at first may not seem to be
related to human rights, but, having met Mr. Adama Diengjust
before this meeting, he said I was completely wrong, and I must
agree with him.
I would suggest that we have been discussing yesterday and
today human rights and world communications. Even world
communications themselves need protection as part of human
rights, human communication rights, as there are countries already trying to block certain information, and the new technologies. We will certainly see more of that later on because, as you
have rightly said, the better they can be spread this information,
the more dangerous they are to governments violating human
rights. May I suggest that both the U.N. and the Human Rights
Institute look closely into these matters in the near future before
they get really dangerous.
MR. FERNANDO: Hans, would you like to comment on
that?
MR. CORELL: Thank you very much. My position is, of
course, that these are matters that are dealt with by Member
States. They take them up in their various human rights commissions, the Third Committee of the General Assembly, and
then this may lead to further work, which at the end of the day
might lead to a Declaration, followed by a Convention if necessary.
But basically, I would suggest that much of this is really covered by the fundamental provisions in the Covenant. If you
study the Covenant, you will see it's very far-reaching. Naturally,
there are possibilities of limiting certain rights laid out in the
Covenant, and that is a very delicate matter. This is one of the
most delicate matters that a national legislature deals with, actually. But certainly the very fact that the matter is mentioned
here means that it has already come to the attention of the parliamentary bodies of the Organization that work with it.
* President, International Bar Association.
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MR. FERNANDO: Thank you, Hans. Are there any more
questions?
MR. SHESTACK: I have a question for the audience. How
many here are involved in human rights efforts within their own
nations and bar associations or NGOs or otherwise? Can I see a
show of hands? That part is very encouraging, but it would be
more encouraging if every hand went up.
It seems to me lawyers are sometimes asked what is their
obligation for pro bono service. It seems to me there is an obligation for pro bono service, part of the common decency; part
of what Fali said - much is given to us, much is expected. And
finally, how can you commit to a profession as a lawyer without
committing to the larger interest of justice? So perhaps at another meeting every hand would go up.
MR. NARIMAN: Permit me to add to what Jerry said. The
U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers also require pro
bono activities on the part of lawyers.
MR. FERNANDO: Thank you.
QUESTION: We have spoken a good deal this afternoon
about the International Commission of Jurists, which reminded
me of the meeting that we had some two years ago at which the
theme was "The Role of the Lawyer in the Enforcement of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights." Now, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights can be regarded
as the twin of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, but it is a neglected twin. That is for understandable reasons, one of which, an important one, is that while most of the
rights in the ICCPR do not involve a great deal of expenditure,
most of the rights in the ICESCR do involve expenditure, and
therefore the ability to comply with that Covenant is limited by
the means of the state which is a signatory of it.
Nevertheless, it does seem to me that this is a Covenant
whose importance ought to be considerably greater than it is
now. I wonder if the very distinguished panel in front of us
would agree that we really do need to place the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights considerably
higher on our agenda as lawyers than we have been used to doing in the past?
MR. FERNANDO: Fali, would you like to respond to that?
MR. NARIMAN: Yes. Thank you, William. That was a very
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important remark. I think that the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has always taken a back
seat until recently. One of the ventures which I submit does
help in its taking a slightly better seat than the back seat is the
United Nations Human Development Ratio and Human Development Index which they come out with from year to year. I
think that has shaken up quite a few governments. It has shaken
up mine.
As to all the great things that you are supposed to be doing
for democracy in your country - ultimately, you wind up not
spending half as much as you should on essential matters, like
education, and spending far too much on buying weapons.
Now, that is itself a great reminder.
I share the feeling that much more is required to be done in
the sphere of economic and social rights as much as in the realm
of political rights, because I don't think that in our lifetime we
will see the Optional Protocol, which is still in a very negative
sort of stage, a stage which will probably never see the light of
day, at least in our lifetime.
So it's up to us lawyers actually to do something about it. So
far as words can help, some of us in the ICJ have formulated a
plan of action, and that was last year. We could perhaps use that
as some sort of a measure of what needs to be done in each and
every country. But certainly, in all the developing countries this
is a prime concern - not merely political rights, but economic
and social rights.
MR. FERNANDO: Jerry, would you like to comment?
MR. SHESTACK: When the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights were adopted, the theory was
that they were interdependent, that one did not have a primacy
over the others. Sometimes repressive nations say, "Well, we
have to worry about our economic rights, and when we're
through we'll do our civil and political rights." But the two are
related.
Someone once observed that a slave with a full belly is still a
slave and a free man who is hungry is also a slave.
The problem is that when you're dealing with civil and
political rights you are essentially dealing with negative rights.
You are saying to a government "thou shalt not repress free
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speech, thou shalt not torture, thou shalt not deny my right to
leave." When you're dealing with economic and social rights you
are dealing with affirmative rights - "you shall provide health,
you shall provide social security, you shall provide education" and the resources for the less-developed nations are not there to
do it. The developed nations have done it through welfare laws
and social security laws. So there has to be a readjustment in
that regard.
These are notjust aspirations, as some people say about economic and social rights. They are rights under the International
Covenant - not just dreams and hopes, they are rights - and
when people don't get those rights their rights are being violated. It is in this area that the Western world has to recognize
those rights and use its resources not to exploit the less-developed nations, but to see to it that those rights are part of the
system of the world order.
QUESTION: I am a member of the IBA Human Rights
Council. My comment is that I would like to congratulate all the
speakers this afternoon. I tend to like the last statement made
by the last speaker, that by the activities this afternoon we have
patched a big hole in the human rights quest.
QUESTION: I was one of a number of lawyers who have
been observing recent subversion trials in Indonesia recently.
We have to write a report about that. The trials were under antisubversion statutes. I don't really want to ask the panel to comment on those questions, but on the genera question, which involves, I suppose, the sovereignty of a state which can define
treason or subversion in a statute and then arrest and charge
individuals with breach of that statute. However independent
the judges, however vigorous the lawyers, the facts may compel a
finding of guilty.
So the question, I suppose, is: how do you analyze human
rights in relation to a treason statute or a subversion statute? If
Mrs. Arbour wants to answer that, I'd be very happy to hear her
answer.
MADAM JUSTICE ARBOUR: In my remarks earlier I think
I mentioned the efforts that are being made internationally in
creating these Tribunals are very much a first. I think we are a
very long way from having the capacity to actually not only moni-
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tor, but have an effective enforcement and control procedure
for that.
The problem that you mentioned is a problem that both
Tribunals, but particularly the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, faces constantly - and, in fact, I should say it's also true of
.the Tribunal for Rwanda.
Because these two Tribunals are perceived to be applying
international norms, acceptable norms ofjustice, there is a flood
of requests by people who assume that they are likely candidates
for prosecution domestically who would like to call on the Tribunal to be charged and tried before international justice. Now,
that speaks volumes to what I said earlier, which was the unwillingness or the inability of domestic states, particularly after very
traumatic political events leading to armed conflict, to deal in a
credible fashion with their own prosecutions.
I don't know what the answer is to that. The one thing
that's very clear is that there cannot be an international institution that would become a shelter to provide a forum in which,
say, abuses - in my case it's abuses, violations of human rights,
have to be prosecuted. Possibly there could be some kind of international appeal route by which the integrity and the legitimacy of domestic proceedings could be monitored.
That is certainly very much a role that the Yugoslav Tribunal
has accepted to play under a project that's called the Rules of
the Road Project, by which the parties to the Dayton Peace Accords have voluntarily submitted their own prosecution to essentially a vetting process by the Tribunal. So that might be a route
by which the international community could develop a mechanism to provide not only, as you mentioned, a scrutiny of the
procedural fairness, but of the very legitimacy of embarking on
these kinds of prosecutions. I think that's some way down the
road, though. Again, state sovereignty is still a pretty potent obstacle to that kind of effort.
MR. NARIMAN: Your question really is a problem of definition. What if a state defines treason in a certain manner, sedition in a certain manner, causing anxiety - and then prosecutes
and said, "Well, I have not violated any rule. It's exactly according to my statute." Well, there is a superior standard now by
which these things have to be judged, and that is in this book.
That's my answer. That's all in this book.
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MR. CORELL: That is an answer.
MR. NARIMAN: But I think this is free.
MR. CORELL: Unfortunately not.
MR. NARIMAN: One word. We had this problem many
years ago in India, how would you define sedition. Now, under
the British regime, sedition, according to what the Privy Council
told us, was affection for your government; therefore, you could
be locked up for life for anything that was disaffection for the
government. Fortunately for us, English judges in the Federal
Court held that no, that's not the true definition of sedition; sedition really means disaffection of government by means of disorder, by bringing disorder into the state, so that some violence
has to accompany it. Fortunately for us, our Supreme Court,
when it had to deal with this question under our Constitution,
followed the Federal Court and refused to follow what the Privy
Council said.
So definitions keep altering from time to time, and I think
there are standards by which they have to be judged. The better
standards are the international instruments. That is why Mr.
Corell kept repeating his second or third proposition, that we
must always try within our national systems to see that the international instruments are also brought in, and there should be a
greater appreciation of them both by our judges and by our lawyers.
MR. FERNANDO: Adama, would you like to respond?
MR. DIENG: Just a footnote to what Justice Arbour has said
regarding the monitoring. I think if one takes the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and Detention, it is
already reviewing cases brought before that Working Group.
That Working Group was established, as you know, by the
United Nations Human Rights Commission. That, in fact, created a lot of concern, particularly during the last session of the
Human Rights Commission, where Cuba was trying to dilute the
mandate of the Working Group by arguing that the Working
Group is interfering in cases which were already finally judged.
But what happened in this area you cannot claim interference. As we were saying earlier, in the field of human rights it is
not only that the principle of noninterference is central, but,
secondly, you have also the collective responsibility, I think, even
of the state.
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In this particular case you raised, I think this is right. We
can certainly use this U.N. group at the first stage. Let's say, for
instance, in the case of Indonesia, just as an example, that the
people were tried, sentenced to death, and we felt that even if
they were sentenced, their detention was arbitrary because we
felt that the whole procedure was totally arbitrary. I think there
is already that avenue which can be used.
QUESTION: I would like to address a question to Madam
Justice Arbour. In the functioning of these two Tribunals has
force been used against any state for enforcement of the orders
or directions of these Tribunals? If so, I would like to have some
particulars or details about it.
MADAM JUSTICE ARBOUR: I think it depends on what
you mean by "force." What is available now is the denunciation
of noncompliance. That to some it is already considerable force,
an affront to their sovereignty, and perceived as such. These are
essentially the means that are at the disposal of the Tribunal.
But every country, in whatever circumstances, has the obligation, for example, to execute arrest warrants and other orders
and to respond to the Prosecutor's request for assistance or orders of the judges. Now these, presumably, in a domestic system
would be seen as compulsion. So if you use "force" in that sense,
this is all available under the statute and it has been used, in the
sense that there are some countries that have executed arrest
warrants, actually arrested, detained, and transferred indictees to
the Tribunal against, if not their better judgment certainly, they
would not have done so, I think, absent that form of compulsion.
So force has been used, I suppose, force used as compulsion.
QUESTION: I am presently the Chairman of the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention. Since Mr. Adama Dieng brought
the matter up, I thought that I would make some comment on it.
I happened to be elected Chairman of the Group as of this year.
He mentioned the issue of Cuba and the issue of Indonesia.
I mightjust indicate to you as to what is the procedure we follow
in that Group and the problems that we face. This is also applicable to what Fali mentioned earlier about the problem of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and why we must talk of
social and economic rights at the presentjuncture and put them
in primacy.
We get a wealth of information and complaints from various

576

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol.21:569

NGOs all over the world. The problem is we ask governments to
respond, but eighty percent of the governments don't respond,
and we have no means to make them respond. Of the twenty
percent who do respond, we adjudicate the case and render a
decision. When we render the decision a government does
nothing about it. So the result is that it is true that we get complaints, it is true we do the follow-up procedure, it is true that we
try to effectuate the disturbing situations that exist in very many
countries and try to bring about some solution, but in effect it
comes to nothing.
And then, in addition to that, the mandate of the group is
challenged in the Human Rights Commission on the ground
that we are seeking to interfere with the sovereignty of the nation, and that is the precise issue that Fali was talking about.
Now, the solution to the problem - of course, we have to
do this because we have to keep the pressure on; we must continue to do this; we must not back off - but the real solution to
the problem is to strengthen the domestic situation. How do
you strengthen the domestic situation? You strengthen it by
pouring in money, by making children literate, by giving primary
education, by improving their economic standing, so that when
they grow up they seek and they make demands for their rights
themselves. When they make the demand for their own rights
the government will respond. So these two things have to work
in tandem. That is the comment that I wish to make. Thank
you.
QUESTION: I am a practitioner in Canada in the human
rights area as well as an author and teacher at the Faculty of Law.
Following from the question that came there, I'm just wondering
what role can the IBA and the United Nations play with respect
to questions where religion or culture may be seen to supersede
human rights, for example, the position of women with the
Taliban moving into Afghanistan? If women have been evicted
or pulled out of the educational system itself, how are we then to
give them the opportunity to struggle for their own rights?
MR. SHESTACK: "How" is a different question. What is going on in Afghanistan as far as women is certainly wrong, and
certainly a violation of the International Covenants on Rights of
Women. To the extent that other nations can bring pressure
through their economic and other assistance and make their
voices felt, I think it's important. For the "have" nations, it
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seems to me it's very important to tie in economic and military
aid to observance of human rights standards. That's required in
the United States. It's not always done by Congress, but at least
that's the standard in our law. And pressure from other nations
can do something.
Now, I don't suggest that you're going to have an immediate effect on the new government, but the new government has
to know that they are violating international standards, and if
they want recognition and respect within the family of nations,
those kind of practices have to change. There is obviously no
simple answer to your question.
QUESTION: I'm a lawyer from India. In the context of
what has been discussed in the last fifteen minutes to half-anhour, I would like to say that one solution - and which has been
perhaps to some extent found in India - is a provision in our
Constitution which recognizes international conventions and
treaties. Now, once you have that kind of a provision in the written Constitution, it would be the duty of the courts to enforce
that. If there is a conflict between the domestic laws and the
international conventions, the courts certainly can give effect to
an international convention or a treaty.
MR. FERNANDO: Thank you very much.
QUESTION: I want to pick up on a comment made by
Legal Counsel Hans Corell on the default by the United States in
paying its dues to the United Nations. The default is of an amazing magnitude because, if my recollection is good, it is
equivalent roughly to one full year of the ordinary budget of the
United Nations. I know they are offering a sixty percent payment subject to conditionality, and God knows whether it will or
will not be accepted.
But my question is addressed both to Hans Corell and to
Madam Justice Louise Arbour. Can one say, as I suspect, that
this is adversely impacting the work of the High Commissioner
on Human Rights and of the human rights agencies in Geneva?
Can we also say that Madam Justice Louise Arbour's work is also
curtailed by the fact that you do not have enough resources, or is
the institution or the trust, where countries can selectively decide what they will endorse and what they will not, being used
right now to make your life a little bit easier in terms of resources?
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MR. CORELL: Thank you very much for asking that question. Of course, when I mentioned it I saw a few smiles in the
room. I don't smile because I am not looking so much at the
dollars; I am looking at the law. As I said, international law cannot be a smorgasbord, where you pick and choose. It means that
you have to abide by the law even in a situation where you may
not be particularly pleased with its effects, but still where you
have contributed yourself, and in particular if you have contributed to decisions that have been taken unanimously in the Organization.
I think it is fair to say that the default by some Member
States in not paying their dues has had a serious impact on the
Organization. I would like to say in the same vein, though, that I
think that states are definitely in a position to criticize the Organization. I am a relative newcomer; I have been here for three
years. I thought I was asked to come here just to participate in
reforming the Organization, and I am actively involved in that
work now.
But I think that, in a sense, the reform work itself can be
hampered if we have to muddle through, as we have done in the
past. I think the audience would be surprised to learn how many
hours I put in alone, as the manager of a relatively small department of 160 people, because of the fact that the Organization
doesn't have sufficient funds, and all the legal consequences that
come out of that. At the same time, the very Member State that I
mentioned in many senses supports the Organization in a tremendously supportive way. Here I think Justice Arbour might
wish to continue.
Exactly what the effects of the non-paid dues are in different
branches of the Organization, I don't think that I can comment
on that. In the Legal Department, certainly many of my lawyers
have suffered. They have worked very hard, long hours, and of
course we don't have any overtime.
There are many competent and hard-working members of
the staff of the United Nations, and they work very hard in spite
of what has been said about them. I think it's one of my duties
to stand up for them, as head of a department, and take them in
defense. I know that the Secretary-General is very concerned
about his staff. I am convinced that if we are given a little time
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and can work meticulously and logically to reform the Organization, we can do so.
But we can't reform the Organization unless the Member
States support us, because ultimately they are the ones who created the Organization, they are the ones who make the ultimate
decisions, they are the ones who hold the purse strings. But
once they have decided on the body, then it is a legal obligation
to pay up, and I think that's clear to everyone.
MADAM JUSTICE ARBOUR: I am even newer to this organization than Hans Corell, so I can speak possibly with even
more naivete about the subject. Contrary to him, I don't view
that as a matter of principle, but as a simple matter of money.
These Tribunals are newborn into an organization that is
supposed to be in a no-growth period. Well, you can't have institutions that are caught in a system that applies a no-growth policy across-the-board when we, having started an investigative
phase, are now entering also a prosecutorial phase.
So I feel very much the consequences, which I assume - I
can only assume it because I'm new to this organization - I assume that the enormous pressures downward in financial constraints are fed in part by this enormous shortfall that the United
Nations is facing. Having said that, I'll say two more things.
There is no way, I think, neither in principle nor in reality,
that these two Tribunals could be sustained through the trust
fund vehicle. As a matter of U.N. policy, as I understand it, the
trust funds are not to be used to fund posts. Well, we are a
human resource-intensive industry. We don't need a lot of
equipment; we just need a lot of people to do the work. So the
trust funds are not a solution for the Tribunals.
The last thing I'm going to say is that, not only in the spirit
of U.N. reform, but in a professional lifetime of working in the
criminal law field, my ambition, apart from ensuring the success
of the enterprise of these two Tribunals, would be to turn them
into models of a lean, and yet efficient, criminal justice system.
I think that one of the great dangers that we face is in having a sort of Western-style-dominated model of justice in which
we are in the process of exporting something that we ourselves
cannot afford. There are very few people in this country, in my
country, across Europe, who can nowadays afford to defend
themselves against a criminal charge unassisted. If that's the
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model that we are trying to export, it is my ambition to try internationally to live up to acceptable standards of decency and respect of human rights, but, to develop a criminal justice system
that should be a model that will make it affordable. But even to
do that I need more money than I have.
QUESTION: On the same question, if I may address Mr.
Corell, is it really enough just to point a finger at a senior or a
very significant member of the United Nations and say "you have
made a legal commitment that you shall pay your annual contribution, and you're not paying and thereby breaking your obligations," when we are all aware that the head of state might be
willing to pay, but he is unable to pay because the legislature that
controls the purse strings, and that is elected every two years or
every four years, for some reason changes its mind and disables
the head of state from complying with the obligation?
The reason I make this point is this has happened now in a
very significant way for the first time. Is there any thought being
given to how this kind of a problem might. be dealt with in the
future? For example, is there any. effort towards making this organization much freer financially than it is today?. In other
words, there are organizations that can develop assets and income of their own so as to be able to protect and sustain their
independence. I'm not saying that the United Nations should
go into business tomorrow, but I am asking is there any thought
being given to this issue?
MR. CORELL: If you were to ask the Permanent Representative of Argentina here until not long ago, he would tell you
that there is one issue that the ambassadors here are discussing,
how we can deal with this, and we discuss it in the Secretariat.
That is the issue.
I recognize the distinction you made, and I think it is a very
important distinction. That is why I used the word, "tragedy." I
think it's tragic for international law that this situation has occurred because we are left with one Member State, which is actually a democratic state under the rule of law, one of the midwives
of the Organization, of the United Nations, which is in this situation now.
I recognize the constitutional problem, and maybe the question is in the Constitution of the country. The fact that I made
reference to it was simply because I have to be credible. I would
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be seen in many countries as a Westerner perhaps pointing fingers at developing countries and going on about human rights.
I have to be credible, as Legal Counsel of the Organization, and
I have to look at how the law is applied by all Member States.
I am convinced that this particular Member State will come
on-board. The Secretary-General is so committed to reforming
the Organization, but he should himself judge what proposals he
should make to Member States. He should not be given
benchmarks by one particular government.
And mind you, if we look at the history books and draw the
conclusions, the future is still in the mist. I think it is important
that now, when we have a window of opportunity, that also the
strong and mighty demonstrate that to apply the law is also in
their interest. As Legal Counsel of the Organization, that is my
concern.
Somebody talked about pouring in money. I made a reference to the UNCITL, the international trade law organization. I
mentioned that in the context of peace and security, and I did
that intentionally, because we can't pour money in. I think
that's the message also from the Secretary-General, that we must
assist states to develop a relative wealth, that they can create their
own, shall we say, business community and so forth. Everything
is so tied together, I think.
Therefore, I think, we have to see also our efforts to
strengthen the trade law as an effort to create the environment
in a Member State in such a way that they become part of the
international community, that they can do business, that they
can compete, and that they can raise the standard of living of
Member States.
Sorry I was so long on this, but I think this is so important,
the issue you raised. My intention is certainly not really to offend any Member State, far from that. I used the word "tragic"
because I think it is tragic. I know that there are so many Americans, and in particular I would like to tell you here there are so
many American lawyers. I have seldom met a legal community
anywhere which is so devoted to human rights, and so active,
and so in the forefront as I have done here. So it is sort of the
paradox that I am looking at. That is why I, rather than just
criticizing, use the word "tragedy," because I think it is.
MR. FERNANDO: Thank you.

